



SU+ @ Strathmore 
University Library  
  
 





The Declining efficacy of Paris and London clubs: 
making the African case for a hybrid framework for 




Doreen B. Areri 









Areri, D. B. (2019). The Declining efficacy of Paris and London clubs: Making the African case for 
a hybrid framework for sovereign debt restructuring (Thesis, Strathmore University). 
Retrieved from http://su-plus.strathmore.edu/handle/11071/6628 
 
 
This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by DSpace @Strathmore  University. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DSpace @Strathmore University. For more 
information, please contact librarian@strathmore.edu 
 
The Declining Efficacy of Paris and London Clubs: Making the African Case for a Hybrid 




Doreen Belinda Areri 
 
 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Laws at 












This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that 








I declare that this work has not been previously submitted and approved for the award of a degree 
by this or any other University. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no 
material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in 
the thesis itself.  
© No part of this thesis may be reproduced without the permission of the author and Strathmore 
University.  
 





The thesis of Doreen Belinda Areri was reviewed and approved by the following:  
 
Dr. Williams Chima Iheme 
Senior Lecturer, Strathmore Law School  
Strathmore University 
 
Dr. Luis G. Francheschi  
Dean, Strathmore Law School,  
Strathmore University  
 
Professor Ruth Kiraka  
Dean, School of Graduate Studies 






For a variety of reasons, such as enhancing economic growth, nations incur debts. For historical 
reasons, this is particularly true for African countries. Unfortunately, owing to a myriad of reasons 
like global financial crises, currency volatility and shortfall in revenue, at times these countries fall 
into difficulties in servicing their debts. During such times, the regime of insolvency provides a 
scenario where such debt may be rescheduled, or restructured, by altering the terms and periods of 
payment. Such debt restructuring mechanisms exist. The objective of the study was to investigate 
whether the existing mechanisms for sovereign debt restructuring are efficient. It also sought to 
evaluate whether debt held by African countries is distinguishable from that of other countries, 
and if so, whether the existing mechanisms for debt restructuring ought to take this into account 
when restructuring debt. The research was centered on desk research with sources of information 
including books, as well as journal articles, reports and working papers, documents issued by the 
government of African countries and international financial institutions such as the World Bank 
and the IMF. The study explored the questions raised through two conceptual frameworks: the 
creditor bargain theory, and the value based theory. It undertook an examination of the debt 
situation in Africa by examining the historical context within which African economies evolved, 
as well as current continent specific concerns, and found that indeed, the debt held by African 
countries, as well as the overall debt situation, is distinguishable from that of other regions. It also 
considered the current debt restructuring mechanisms and concluded that they are indeed 
inefficient for debt restructuring, and even more so, in restructuring debt held by African countries. 
While appreciating that there are reforms underway to correct the insufficiencies of the current 
mechanisms, the study concluded that these reforms were fundamentally inefficient for their 
purpose. It considered the creation of a framework that incorporates existing and proposed reforms, 
to come up with a system that is comprehensive for debt restructuring. It concluded that such a 
system was a suitable replacement for the existing mechanisms, especially for African countries. 
The study drew to a close by recommending that a multilateral effort be put into creating such a 
mechanism. It further recommended that debt sustainability measures be undertaken to curb 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
1.1.1. Why does Africa borrow1? 
Africa’s debt uptake is informed by a variety of reasons. Chief among them, is to finance her 
countries’ considerable developmental needs. There exists historical context to Sub-Saharan 
Africa2’s uptake of debt. To begin with, Sub-Saharan Africa’s debt traces its roots to colonialism. 
It has indeed been argued that the foundations of Africa’s debt crisis was set during the colonial 
period3.  
A key pillar of colonialism was economic subjugation4, by requiring Africans to relinquish control 
of local economies. Robust and sustainable production methods, and strengthening the economy 
were sacrificed as a result of this, owing to the need by colonial powers to receive maximum 
economic benefit from the subject African nation at the least possible price5. Subsequent to the 
departure of colonial powers, this situation was not improved. One of the key legacies of 
colonialism was that colonial African economies, as a result of colonial overemphasis on single 
cash crop production, prioritized the production of few agricultural products for consumption in 
global markets6.  
 
A further result of this distortion of African trading and production systems resulted in some 
defects, like over-reliance on imports, the high concentration on few commodities,  increased 
instability of exports earning, as well as crises in making payments7. This necessitated borrowing 
to supplement domestic resources8.  Another driver of Africa’s borrowing has been presented as 
                                                          
1 For ease of reference, ‘Africa’ herein will be used to refer to her countries.  
2 The investigation will be restricted to Anglophone countries owing to language limitations. 
3 Omotola J, Sailu H, ‘Foreign aid, debt relief and Africa’s developments: Problems and prospects’ South African 
Journal of International Affairs (2009), 91 
4 Settles JD, ‘The impact of colonialism on African economic development’, Published thesis, University of 
Tennessee, 1996, p.8 
5 Settles JD, ‘The impact of colonialism on African economic development’, Published thesis, University of 
Tennessee, 1996, p.6 
6 Settles JD, ‘The impact of colonialism on African economic development’, Published thesis, University of 
Tennessee, 1996, 11 
7 Omotola J, Sailu H, ‘Foreign aid, debt relief and Africa’s developments: Problems and prospects’ South African 
Journal of International Affairs (2009), 91 
8 Brooks S, Lombardi D, Suruma E, ‘African perspectives on sovereign debt restructuring’, CIGI’s Global Economy 





the decline in commodity prices particularly in the 1970s and after the global financial crisis of 
20089.  
 
When commodity prices declined sharply, there was a clear downturn in industrial countries and 
governments did not react promptly to salvage the situation and African economies were unable 
to adjust accordingly10. As proceeds from African exports decreased, her countries were impelled 
to borrow to plug budget deficits11. From a supply perspective, several economic and geopolitical 
factors have increased the probability of lending to African countries12, and this includes but not 
limited to the fast growth of African markets, and the possibility of higher returns owing to a 
rapidly growing population, increased spending power of the populace and highly priced credit13.  
 
More recently, Sub-Saharan Africa has been faced with poor leadership, which invariably leads to 
poor economic management, illicit financial flows, wasteful expenditure, as well as the 
misappropriation of borrowed funds by a rogue political class14. Poor governance in Sub-Saharan 
countries has also contributed to the rise in indebtedness. A prominent example is Mozambique, 
currently in debt distress owing to hidden loans issued by public companies, but guaranteed by the 
government; this has contributed to the increase in debt.15  
 
Additionally, the uptake of odious debt (which makes reference to sovereign debt that has been 
incurred without the consent of the people in whose name it is taken, and does not benefit the said 
                                                          
9 Brooks S, Lombardi D, Suruma E, ‘African perspectives on sovereign debt restructuring’, CIGI’s Global Economy 
Program, Kampala, 7 August 2014. Available at CIGI, 2 
10 Humphreys C, Underwood J, “The external debt difficulties of Low-Income Africa”,  Dealing with the Debt 
Crisis, Washington DC, August 1989 (available on file with the World Bank) 
11 Were A, Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options, South African Institute of International 
Affairs, Policy Insights 66, August 2018, at 3 
12 Brooks S, Lombardi D, Suruma E, ‘African perspectives on sovereign debt restructuring’, CIGI’s Global 
Economy Program, Kampala, 7 August 2014. Available at CIGI, 6 
13 Were A, Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options, South African Institute of International 
Affairs, Policy Insights 66, August 2018, at 3, at 3 
14 Omotola J, Sailu H, ‘Foreign aid, debt relief and Africa’s developments: Problems and prospects’ South African 
Journal of International Affairs (2009), 91 






people)16 has increased Africa’s debt burden17. Some creditors have been complicit in unduly 
increasing the debt in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some Western countries involved in the destabilization 
of African political and social environments, and thereafter installing leaders they considered to 
be supportive of their interests18, and thus nudging them to recklessly acquire burdensome debt 
into these economies.  
 
A notorious example was the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the United States, 
through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) backed the ousting of the first popularly elected 
Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, and oversaw the installation of the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko 
as his replacement19. The USA, in order to keep Mobutu’s loyalties, helped inject into the economy 
exceedingly huge amounts of money in debt20, despite knowing that the money was being diverted 
away from development and used for personal interests21. By the time Mobutu was deposed in 
1997, DRC had amassed external debt of USUS $ 14 billion, while the majority of her populace 
lived in poverty22.   
 
1.1.2. The evolving composition of African debt 
African debt has morphed, considerably, from the 1980s, particularly with regard to the supply 
side. For a long time, Western countries such as the United States of America, France, Canada and 
the United Kingdom23, were Africa’s largest creditors24. Now, the World Bank notes that low 
income countries have shifted towards riskier and more expensive sources of financing, such as 
                                                          
16 Jaoko IP, ‘In defence of the formal recognition of the doctrine of odious debts: A study on African debts’, 
Unpublished LL.B thesis, Strathmore University, January, 2017, vii 
17 Jaoko IP, ‘In defence of the formal recognition of the doctrine of odious debts: A study on African debts’, 
Unpublished LL.B thesis, Strathmore University, January, 2017, 7 
18 Jaoko IP, ‘In defence of the formal recognition of the doctrine of odious debts: A study on African debts’, 
Unpublished LL.B thesis, Strathmore University, January, 2017, 7 
19 Weissman S, ‘What Really Happened in Congo The CIA, the Murder of Lumumba, and the Rise of Mobutu’ 
Foreign Affairs (July/August 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/democratic-republic-congo/2014-06-
16/what-really-happened-congo on 23 April, 2019 
20 Robarge D, ‘CIA’s Covert operations in the Congo, 1960–1968: Insights from newly declassified documents’ 
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 58, No. 3 September 2014, at 2 (available on file with the Central Intelligence Agency) 
21‘ Collins CJL, Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo’ Foreign Policy in Focus, 1 July 1997 
https://fpif.org/zairedemocratic_republic_of_the_congo/ on 23 April, 2019 
22 Ndikumana L, Boyce JK, ‘Congo's odious debt: External borrowing and capital flight in Zaire’, Vol 29, 
Development and Change Journal, (1998) at 195 
23 http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/communications/page/permanent-members on 5 May, 2019 
24 Were A, Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options, South African Institute of International 





bond issuances25. It is noted that multilateral creditors and Paris-Club creditors have declined in 
importance as a source of financing26. Indeed, external borrowing from private creditors has also 
grown significantly in recent years27. Reportedly, countries that largely depend on commodities, 
including some Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) constitute the bulk of issuers.  
 
To begin with, the share of multilateral and concessional debt from bilateral (owed from one 
government to another28) and multilateral (debt that is owed to a consortium of creditors, like the 
World Bank29) sources has declined considerably30. Conversely, lending from non-Paris Club 
creditors has increased31. An obvious example is China, a non-Paris Club creditor. Currently, 
China alone owns what amounts to 14% of sub-Saharan Africa indebtedness. In Kenya, of her 
bilateral debt, China’s constitutes about 66%32. Sino-African debt has largely been as a result of 
China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI), whose primary concern is infrastructure financing with a view 
to “connect Asian, European and African continents”33.  
  
Finally, African countries have increasingly flocked to international markets, issuing bonds, which 
have allowed countries to increase the volume of borrowing, over shorter periods and diversify 
their investor base34. Since 2006, several African countries including Ghana, Gabon, Senegal, 
Nigeria and Kenya have issued Eurobonds on international markets35. Access to financing from 
private markets by Sub-Saharan African countries has been lauded as important for economic 
development, even inevitable36. This financing has been described as better than concessional debt 
                                                          
25 International Development Association, Debt vulnerabilities in IDA countries, 4 October, 2018, at 3 
26 International Development Association, Debt vulnerabilities in IDA countries, 4 October, 2018, at 3 
27 International Development Association, Debt vulnerabilities in IDA countries, 4 October, 2018, at 3 
28 UNCTAD Report 2016, Economic development in Africa: Debt dynamics and development finance in Africa, 
2016, 30 
29 Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings, Is sub-Saharan Africa facing another systemic sovereign debt crisis?, April 
2019, 10 
30 Mustapha S, Prizzon A, Africa’s rising debt: How to avoid a new crisis, October 2018, at 4 
 
31 Mustapha S, Prizzon A, Africa’s rising debt: How to avoid a new crisis, October 2018, at 4 
32 Were A, Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options, South African Institute of International 
Affairs, Policy Insights 66, August 2018, at 3, at 4 
33 Were A, Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options, South African Institute of International 
Affairs, Policy Insights 66, August 2018, at 3, at 4 
34 Mustapha S, Prizzon A, Africa’s rising debt: How to avoid a new crisis, October 2018, at 5 
35 Brooks S, Lombardi D, Suruma E, ‘African perspectives on sovereign debt restructuring’, CIGI’s Global 
Economy Program, Kampala, 7 August 2014. Available at CIGI, 6 






for African countries. For example, private loans are not made conditional on policy requirements 
made by entities like the IMF37. Borrowing from private markets may also arguably enhance 
transparency where expenditure of these monies is concerned, owing to enhanced scrutiny by 
foreign investors38. The borrowing countries are also ostensibly subjected to the discipline of the 
markets, with additional attention being paid to economic development and policies 
domestically39.  
 
Market financing, is not, however, a panacea to Sub-Saharan African debt. While diversification 
of debt portfolio is certainly advised, sovereign bonds come with great exposure to risk.  There are 
exchange and interest rate risks, as well as far higher interest rate risks, as compared to multilateral 
and bilateral debts40. Additionally, access to financial markets and the attendant benefits, does not 
address the concerns relating to weak debt management policies41, such as the wasteful 
consumption of borrowed monies and the disproportionate use of national resources and revenue 
to service debt42. For example, Kenya has issued three Eurobonds, as at 2019, despite experiencing 
difficulty in servicing the first two43. 
 
Reportedly, debt management for Sub-Saharan countries remains weak, with a deterioration in the 
indicators for good management between 2007 and 201744. The Debt Management Performance 
Assessment (DeMPA) developed by the World Bank indicated, in 2018, that out of 22 (twenty-
two) African countries, only 50% have met minimum standards for international standards set for 
effective debt management45. The African Development Bank (AfDB) has also expressed concerns 
about market financing. They note that infrastructure projects, which are largely why African 
                                                          
37 Brooks S, Lombardi D, Suruma E, ‘African perspectives on sovereign debt restructuring’, CIGI’s Global 
Economy Program, Kampala, 7 August 2014. Available at CIGI, 6 
38 Brooks S, Lombardi D, Suruma E, ‘African perspectives on sovereign debt restructuring’, CIGI’s Global 
Economy Program, Kampala, 7 August 2014. Available at CIGI, 7 
39 Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings, Is sub-Saharan Africa facing another systemic sovereign debt crisis?, April 
2019, 11 
40 Mustapha S, Prizzon A, Africa’s rising debt: How to avoid a new crisis, October 2018, at 5 
41 Mustapha S, Prizzon A, Africa’s rising debt: How to avoid a new crisis, October 2018, at 5 
42 ‘Kisero J, Our debt management policy is flawed’ Business Daily, 23 November, 2017, 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/analysis/Our-debt-management-policy-is-flawed/539548-4200098-
e6rk6n/index.html on 5 May, 2019 
43 https://www.ecofinagency.com/finance/2305-40089-kenya-s-third-eurobond-approved-for-listing-on-euronext-
dublin on 30 May, 2019 
44 Mustapha S, Prizzon A, Africa’s rising debt: How to avoid a new crisis, October 2018, at 6 





countries have been borrowing, lately, have long gestation periods, while the Eurobond maturities 
are far shorter. The rise of interest rates with every bond issuance increases macroeconomic 
vulnerability46. Additionally, market finance is seldom accompanied by creditor initiated efforts 
to build sound fiscal policies and institutions.  
1.1.3. Africa’s recurrent debt burden 
Historically, and currently, Africa’s debt can hardly be considered sustainable. In fact, Africa’s 
debt burden, has for decades become a recurring issue47.  After attaining independence, many 
African countries kicked off development programs in their respective countries, which required 
external funding48. Low levels of private capital coming into the continent characterized the 1980s, 
however, and combined with inadequate domestic reserves, many African countries suffered 
domestic (financial) deficiencies49. Eventually, many African governments were forced to rely on 
taxation of exports of commodities to raise revenue. Unfortunately, the fall of international primary 
commodity prices, slashed export earnings and governments’ abilities to service their debt reduced 
considerably50. 
 
Africa has also faced governance challenges that have contributed to the debt burden. Corruption, 
in particular, is a cause for concern, in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is a strong argument to be made 
for the direct contribution of corruption to the increase of unnecessary public debt. Almost 
invariably, corruption serves to distort how public monies should be expended, and this results in 
inefficient allocation of government expenditure51. Unfortunately, there is a prominent example of 
such inefficient use of public funds is Kenya. The auditor general reported, for the year ending 
June 2014, that out of the revenue recorded during the financial year of 2013/2014, which 
amounted to over KShs. 960 billion, only KShs. 36 billion was properly accounted for.52. Cooray 
                                                          
46 Mustapha S, Prizzon A, Africa’s rising debt: How to avoid a new crisis, October 2018, at 6 
47 Omotola J, Sailu H, ‘Foreign aid, debt relief and Africa’s developments: Problems and prospects’ South African 
Journal of International Affairs (2009), 87 
48 Omotola J, Sailu H, ‘Foreign aid, debt relief and Africa’s developments: Problems and prospects’ South African 
Journal of International Affairs (2009), 91 
49 All Party Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development, Africa’s multilateral debt: A modest proposal, 1994, at 
19 
50 All Party Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development, Africa’s multilateral debt: A modest proposal, 1994, at 
19 
51 Cooray, Arusha; Schneider, Friedrich, How does corruption affect public debt? An empirical analysis, Working 
Paper, No. 1322, 4 
52 Office of the Auditor General Kenya, Summary Of The Report Of The Auditor-General On The Financial 
Statements For Ministries Departments, Commissions, Funds And Other Accounts Of The National Government For 





et al, argue that endemic corruption results into greater income inequality, reduced investment, 
distortion of budget allocations and lower GDP per capita. As a result, there is greater government 
spending, which then raises public debt53.  
 
After enjoying a period of arguably manageable debt54, African debt is on the rise once more. 
According to the IMF, the external debt ratio for low-income countries should not rise above 
40%55. Currently, the debt-to-GDP ratio in Africa has risen to levels above 50%56. This typically 
increases the likelihood of countries getting into debt distress57 which the IMF58 indicates occurs 
when a country struggles to repay its debt, characterized by arrears, or the likelihood of 
restructuring of the debt. 
 
According to the World Bank59, forty-nine percent of low income countries face the possibility of 
debt distress.  Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced the largest increase in the median public debt-
to-GDP ratio, and the World Bank notes that this is up 20 percentage points, from already high 
levels60.  Anzetse Were61 reports that by 2017 some economies had amassed significant debt, with 
countries like Ethiopia, Kenya and Zambia being warned that they needed to tighten the reins on 
public spending. Reportedly, some countries like Gabon, Kenya, Angola Sudan and Mauritius 
have a collective GDP of more than US $300 billion with debt-to-GDP ratios above 60%62, which 
according to the IMF recommended thresholds, is dangerous. Evidently, trouble looms and debt 
restructuring ought to be a consideration for a number of these countries. This then raises a 
                                                          
53 Cooray, Arusha; Schneider, Friedrich, How does corruption affect public debt? An empirical analysis, Working 
Paper, No. 1322, 4 
54 Were A, Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options, South African Institute of International 
Affairs, Policy Insights 66, August 2018, at 3, at 3 
55 Were A, Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options, South African Institute of International 
Affairs, Policy Insights 66, August 2018, at 3, at 2 
56 Were A, Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options, South African Institute of International 
Affairs, Policy Insights 66, August 2018, at 3, at 2 
57 Were A, Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options, South African Institute of International 
Affairs, Policy Insights 66, August 2018, at 3, at 2 
58 ‘IMF: Joint World Bank-IMF debt sustainability framework for low-income countries’ IMF, 15 August 2018 
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/39/Debt-Sustainability-Framework-for-Low-
Income-Countries on 29 January 2019 
59 International Development Association, Debt vulnerabilities in IDA countries, 4 October, 2018, 9 
60 International Development Association, Debt vulnerabilities in IDA countries, 4 October, 2018, 9 
61 Were A, Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options, South African Institute of International 
Affairs, Policy Insights 66, August 2018, at 3, at 2 
62 Were A, Debt trap? Chinese loans and Africa’s development options, South African Institute of International 





concern, as to why African countries face recurrent debt burdens, and difficulty in making 
repayments.  
 
Sanford63 postulates that the problem is not the debt, or even the size of the debt in itself. Indeed, 
he notes that other regions typically owe much more. The problem presented is that there is a huge 
debt size, relative to the size of Sub-Saharan African economies. The debt size is also 
disproportionate in size to these countries’ export income. Africa’s unique debt sustainability and 
repayment problem is further exacerbated by currency volatility. UNCTAD64 notes that African 
countries hold debt in foreign currencies such as US Dollar and Euro, with some holding the debt 
in a variety of other currencies. Unfortunately, when an African country holds debt in a non-local 
currency, it is more exposed to shocks related to exchange rates, as well as macro-economic 
upheavals65, which hamper their ability to repay the debt.66.  Africa’s unique governance problems 
discussed before in this thesis, in the background to the problem, a great deal of them a result of 
colonialism, also hamper debt sustainability of debt and as a result, repayment of the same67.  
1.2. Literature Review 
1.2.1. Debt restructuring mechanisms (Paris, London, HIPCs, MDRI)   
According to Elbadawi, Ndulu and Ndung’u68, African countries incurred huge, unsustainable 
sovereign debt between the mid-1970s and late 1990s. Seeking debt relief through sovereign debt 
restructuring became inevitable69. Africa owed a substantial amount of its debt to international 
financial institutions (IFIs), like the World Bank, the IMF and the AfDB, as well as bilateral 
                                                          
63 Sanford JE, ‘Africa’s debt burden: Proposals for further forgiveness’ 189 Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (1996), 1 
64 UNCTAD Report 2016, Economic development in Africa: Debt dynamics and development finance in Africa, 
2016, 37 
65 Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings, Is sub-Saharan Africa facing another systemic sovereign debt crisis?, April 
2019, 8 
66 UNCTAD Report 2016, Economic development in Africa: Debt dynamics and development finance in Africa, 
2016, 37 
67 Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings, Is sub-Saharan Africa facing another systemic sovereign debt crisis?, April 
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creditors belonging to the Paris Club70. The different modes of debt restructuring are discussed 
here. 
 
In the period subsequent to the 2nd World War, there was the introduction of development aid 
targets71. These, coupled with competition with the Soviet Bloc resulted in western developed 
countries extending large amounts of debt to developing countries72. Some Latin-American 
countries started to be overleveraged by the mid-1950s73.  Argentina was one of the countries that 
needed to have its debt rescheduled, and as such in 1956, the first meeting in Paris was held among 
some European countries, under the ambit of the French Treasury. Thus the Paris Club was born 
(the nomenclature is informed by the venue of meeting.)74 
 
The Paris Club is described by Omotola and Sailu75 as a group of creditor countries that have lent 
to developing nations. This club does not operate formally, and at the time, did not have permanent 
members. The Paris Club’s secretariat is operated under the umbrella of the French Treasury, and 
works closely with the Bretton Woods Institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) as well as 
UNCTAD76. Over the last few years of the twentieth century, the Club emerged as one of the 
foremost avenues for engagement in consultation over debt rescheduling agreements, with a view 
to deal with distress77.  
 
Brown and Bulman78 explain the four principles taken into account when scheduling Paris Club 
debt. These are: 
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a. The possibility of default, which indicates that lending nations will not consider the debt 
eligible for rescheduling until the debtor has gotten into distress, or it is apparent that it is 
going to (initially, the Paris club provided relief to countries suffering temporary liquidity 
problems79, but now only deals with countries that are in default or about to be in default. 
In view of this, the Paris Club does not particularly help with early prevention of 
distress80.); 
b. Conditionality, which makes a credit agreement with the IMF a condition precedent to 
rescheduling;  
c. The creditors must provide aid, that is proportional with their exposure to the country in 
debt;  
d. Unanimous approval of a rescheduling agreement by all Paris Club creditors. There are 
hardly creditor holdouts with Paris Club rescheduling processes owing to the fact that one 
of the principles upon which the club operates is unanimity81 and adoption of decisions 
by consensus, as opposed to the London Club that adopts decisions by unanimity82.  
 
Loosely defined, the London Club is another ad hoc solution for rescheduling and restructuring 
debt, similar to the Paris Club, save that it comprises commercial creditors and deals with 
commercial debt. It was formed in the 1970s as a convenient mechanism for loan management but 
as McConnell83 notes, was ‘solidified by a series of trials and crises in the 1980s’. 
 
Notably, the London Club, constitutes lenders who lend commercial debt. They largely deal with 
Latin American and Asian borrowers, while the mainstay of the Paris Club has been lower income 
Sub Saharan countries84. The inaugural meeting of London Club lenders was hosted in London in 
1976, with the intent of rescheduling Zaire’s debts85. The two clubs provided the most common 
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form of debt relief for lower income African countries in the 1970s and 1980s. However, as 
Brooks, Lombardi and Suruma86 write, they both failed to adequately address the underlying debt 
situation in many developing countries.  
 
The World Bank and the IMF attempted to improve this by launching the HIPC initiative in 1996, 
bolstered by the MDRI in 201687. Both helped to marginally restore the sustainability of Sub 
Saharan countries’ sovereign debt positions88. The HIPC Initiative was launched so as to ensure 
that countries that are poor do not deal with debt burdens they cannot manage.89  To qualify for 
debt relief, the debtor country was required to entrench in her economic plans poverty alleviation 
programs, which then allowed the IMF and World Bank to provided interim debt relief90. Upon 
illustration of a track record of good performance on the poverty alleviation plans, the two 
institutions would then provide more substantial reliefs. However, by the mid-2000s, it was noted 
that low income countries needed a lot more debt relief91.  
 
The MDRI, initiated by the IMF, the African Development Fund and the International 
Development Association), would result in the cancellation of 100% of debt owed to these 
institutions. This cancellation would benefit countries that successfully went through the full HIPC 
initiatives92. While noting that HIPC and MDRI have been very useful in providing debt reliefs, 
Brooks, Lombardi and Suruma93 are concerned that these were only temporary, one off solutions. 
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Indeed,  more recently, Chad received debt relief under  the HIPC 2015. Currently, just three HIPC 
countries remain: Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea, in spite of ballooning debt on the continent94.  
 
1.3. Statement of the Problem 
As indicated earlier in the background to this study, Africa’s debt profile has changed completely, 
in a variety of ways. External debt has risen, the proportion of commercial debt has risen, in 
comparison to debt granted on concessional terms, there is a greater variety where sources of credit 
are concerned, and there is greater uptake of Eurobonds95.  For reasons explored further in this 
thesis, and particularly in Chapter 3, this paper contends that the current debt restructuring 
mechanisms are no longer efficient. UNCTAD96 acknowledges that currently, debt restructuring 
operations are multifaceted, expensive and ultimately time consuming, owing to the number of 
institutions and informal organizations a debtor country needs to approach to have the debt 
restructured.  This speaks to the efficacy (in this case, the lack thereof) of the Paris and London 
clubs. There is need to rethink a better framework. 
 
As the profile of African debt has changed to include a larger and more diffuse creditor base, as 
well as different sources of credit97, the Paris Club has largely become inefficient for restructuring 
debt for African countries’ sovereign debt98. Additionally, there are hardly any well-defined 
procedures for negotiating the restructuring of sovereign bonds99. The London Club does not fare 
any better. Reportedly, with regard to debt owed to private creditors, such as commercial banks 
and bondholders, take almost a decade to conclude. The result is that debtor countries end up more 
indebted, compared to when the debt treatment began100. These delays are occasioned by a variety 
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of reasons, including the need to consolidate outstanding claims that are impinged by the default 
in question, lack of information symmetry between bargaining parties (the debtors and creditors), 
as well as limited enforceability of contracts between creditors and debtors101. Thus, one off 
initiatives such as the HIPC and MDRI are certainly not sustainable. 
 
In light of the issues raised in this paper, to wit: the waning relevance of the present methods of 
sovereign debt restructuring (the Paris and London Clubs), and the seeming inadequacies of using 
the SDRM or CAC methods exclusively, this paper, in Chapter 2 and 4, will examine the case for 
establishment of a hybrid framework that will take into account Africa’s realities and peculiarities, 
in as far as debt is concerned. Ostensibly, this hybrid system will combine salient elements of both 
contractual and statutory approaches102. A hybrid system that takes into account “objectivity, 
impartiality, inclusivity, comprehensiveness ad conclusiveness” has been proposed103. This paper 
will attempt to examine the establishment, feasibility and possible effectiveness for such a 
framework for adequate treatment of African debt. 
 
1.4. Research Hypothesis  
This paper proceeds from the hypothesis that the current methods for sovereign debt restructuring, 
primarily the Paris and London Clubs, are not efficient for African countries, thus, informing the 
need to establish a hybrid system to rescheduling of debt.  
 
1.5. Research Questions 
This paper seeks to answer four principal questions.  
a. Is Africa’s debt situation unique, necessitating special treatment when restructuring 
sovereign debt? 
b. Are the Paris and London clubs suitable for sovereign debt restructuring for African 
countries? 
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c. Is the establishment of a hybrid framework for sovereign debt restructuring, incorporating 
a statutory arrangement and a contractual approach, necessary?  
d. What tailor-made recommendations are suitable for the management of sovereign 
borrowing in Africa? 
 
1.6. Theoretical Framework 
“When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same manner as when 
it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy is always 
the measure which is both least dishonourable to the debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor.” 
Adam Smith. (1723–1790).  Wealth of Nations104. 
It is important to have a debt restructuring mechanism that is both efficient, and one that does not 
occasion undue harm to the debtors. This study will evaluate sovereign debt restructuring through 
the lens of the Creditors Bargain Theory and the Value Based Theory.  
1.6.1. Creditor Bargain Theory 
This theory, as developed by Baird and Jackson105, proceeds on the idea that there is a hypothetical 
bargain that creditors will ostensibly reach.  One of the end goals of the said theory is to have 
maximization of the value of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of the creditors106. This thesis will 
evaluate the treatment of debt relief through the lens of creditors who attempt to maximize the 
assets of the country in distress, so as to achieve a bargain that would have been availed of them, 
had the bargain been done ex-ante. In this way, an evaluation of the proposed hybrid system of 
debt restructuring will benefit from an analysis of whether the value of the debtor’s assets are 
maximized.  
1.6.2. Value Based Theory  
This theory of bankruptcy was proposed by Korobkin107. It considers that the process of 
bankruptcy has to be undertaken with regard to social and political considerations as well as the 
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circumstances attendant to the situation108. This theory illustrates that bankruptcy law attempts to 
resolve issues that emanate from financial distress, which encompass social, political and 
economic dimensions109. This will be useful in analyzing the unique situation that Sub-Saharan 
African debtors find themselves in, during debt restructuring. The participants are able to give their 
contribution to the process with the benefit of the knowledge of historical contexts, as well as the 
dynamic nature of the issues in question110. This will assist in coming up with a method that 
addresses financial distress in a comprehensive manner111.   
1.7. Approach and Methodology 
The research will be solely desk research. The information sources will include books, journal 
articles, policy briefs, reports, discussion and working papers, data and documentation issued by 
international monetary institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as 
well as other documents. The information will be analyzed with a view to evaluate the debt 
situation in Africa, and to come up with appropriate mechanisms to restructure sovereign debt. 
1.8. Limitations 
This study is limited by the nature of its design and methodology that does not include fieldwork. 
Further, this paper does not benefit from the research in Francophone and Lusophone African 
countries, owing to language limitations. 
 
1.9. Chapter Breakdown 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. This chapter is introductory. It sets out the background of 
the problem, the statement of the problem, the theoretical framework, the hypothesis, the research 
questions, the methodology and approach, and the chapter layout. The second chapter will address 
the evolving nature of African debt and determine whether her debt situation is unique. The third 
chapter will examine the efficacy of the Paris and London Clubs’ methods of sovereign debt 
restructuring in the face of this. The fourth chapter will examine the hybrid framework for debt 
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restructuring incorporating the statutory and contractual approaches. Chapter five will make 






CHAPTER TWO: AFRICA’S DEBT BURDEN 
2.1. Introduction 
When discussing debt, and in particular when it is taken up by African countries, there has been 
an inclination towards pathologization of the same112. Mugasha113 notes that the idea of debt as a 
crisis in and of itself is mythical and argues that debt, in and of itself, is not necessarily bad. 
Additionally, the use of debt to bolster economic growth is not bad either. He notes that debt has 
certain advantages, such as its use in funding national projects where there is a constraint on 
revenue.   
Africa, in particular, considering its vast developmental needs, requires all the financing it can 
get114. Africa has complex development challenges, owing to colonial legacies115, and has 
financing capacity constraints and as such has sought to leverage all possible sources of finance116. 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)117 estimates that to make 
it feasible for Africa to finance its Sustainable Development Goals, injection into the economy of 
between US $600 million and US $ 1.2 trillion per year, would be needed. Africa, however, can 
only manage to come up with half this amount. As such, both external and domestic debts have to 
be considered as one of the financing options118.  However, debt sustainability is equally important, 
and Africa has faced quite a number of vulnerabilities in this regard, before119. In fact, it has been 
argued that Africa is currently facing the risk of a debt crisis120.  
This study’s hypothesis is that a new debt rescheduling mechanism is necessary for sovereign debt 
held by African countries. What, if anything, about African debt, necessitates special treatment by 
insolvency regimes and frameworks? This chapter seeks to answer this question. It will evaluate 
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the peculiarities (if any), of African debt, its fraught history, as well as the current debt situation. 
It will also interrogate that idea that there has been an evolution in Africa’s debt profile to reflect 
diverse lending sources, new needs, as well as new challenges to debt sustainability. 
 
2.2. Conceptualizing Africa’s borrowing 
2.2.1. Why does Africa need to borrow?  
It is necessary, while seeking to understand Africa’s debt appetite, to examine Africa’s economic 
history. Over the years, African countries have been chided by Western leaders and institutions, 
over irresponsible economic policies that have left their countries in need of aid and loans from 
various institutions. A recent example that comes to mind is the former American President Barack 
Obama finger wagging at African countries, urging them to “stop making excuses” for their 
economic woes and onerous debt situations121.  
 
While such criticisms of Africa’s debt uptake are likely well meaning, albeit paternalistic, they 
hardly paint the entire picture with regard to why Africa has needed to borrow in the past, and 
indeed, currently. Reducing Africa’s debt problems and financing needs to “corruption” and 
“governance” is not dishonest, but it does paint an incomplete scenario122. Tracing the roots of 
Africa’s compromised economy would lead us as far back as the scramble and partition of 
Africa123.  
 
This thesis, for purposes of brevity, however, will only go back as far as post-independence Africa. 
Frantz Fanon, in the book “The Wretched of the Earth124” notes that colonialism left in its wake, 
economic dependence, writing that they traded “artillery shelling and scorched earth policy” in for 
this.  
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It has been argued that the economic ends of colonialism were envisioned to be the provision of 
as much economic value to the colonialist at the lowest possible price125. African economies were 
brought under the control of Europe, with a view to oversee production from start to finish. Before 
colonialism, African economies exercised substantial control over their economic development. 
The goods they produced were used for both internal consumption, and for export in the event of 
surplus126. This was changed by colonial powers requiring countries to produce almost exclusively 
for export, with a desire to ensure that prices for consumers back home, were kept as low as 
possible. In a perverse sense, Africa was completely integrated into the world economic system, 
but as unequal partners127.  
Settles128 argues further that gains from agriculturally capable Africa were carted off by colonial 
governments, leaving Africa vulnerable to the shocks of the fluctuations of demand for the primary 
products she produced. Perhaps, however, the most substantial adverse effect of colonialism in 
Africa was the creation of a perverse specialization, with a singular focus on cash crop 
production129.  
A good number of colonial African economies were producing one or two cash crops, destined for 
European markets. This is in contrast to the pre-colonial period where there was diverse production 
of consumer goods130. The result was the creation of over-reliance on European imports131. 
Frenkema, writing for the World Economic Forum, argues further that with the expansion of 
imports of European manufacturers, the diversification of African economies was stunted 
prematurely132. Notably, only white-dominated settler economies like South Africa and Zimbabwe 
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operated with independence, albeit with considerable reliance on coerced African labour133. In 
addition to this, colonial powers sought to collect as much tax as possible from their colonial 
subjects, without spending nearly as much in the said countries. By way of example, in West 
African British colonies, there was the creation of new statutory export marketing boards, which 
collected huge surpluses by creating a considerable margin between the price paid to the producers 
of goods, and the price received by the boards for the said goods on the world market. The 
surpluses remained in London, with no repatriation to the colonial subjects134.  
Another legacy was the breakup of large colonies upon independence. Co-operation of African 
countries in relation to trade was brought to a halt, and all African trade was primarily focused on 
the international export market135. Essentially, after the colonialists left the continent, Africa was 
left with distorted and fragile national economies, characterized by limited export bases, weak 
industrial sectors and economies that were largely oriented externally136.  
Onimode137 has argued, in addition to this, that colonialism left Africa heavily dependent on 
exports, with a greater focus on few commodities, with insufficient terms of trade, as well as 
unstable earnings from exports. Many African economies would be unable to hold fast in the face 
of the impending post-colonial shocks, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Africa attained 
independence, against the backdrop of this weak economic situation.  
It is against this background, that one can begin to understand Africa’s history and impetus to 
borrow. Immediately after independence, the clamour to jump-start development programs began. 
Anti-colonial ideologies had promised previous colonial subjects improved living conditions138. 
These development programs relied largely on external funding to be carried out. Additionally, to 
boost growth of African economies which had been severely compromised by colonialism, the 
quantity of investment in the economy needed to be heightened139. There was unfortunately, no 
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surplus to inject into the economy owing to the distorted factors of production that have been 
discussed, and in its absence, alternative funds had to be sought through incurring of debt. For 
these reasons, African countries started to seek external sources of money to supplement their 
savings and to fill in gaps in investments140. This began Africa’s dance with debt. It ought to be 
reiterated that borrowing is not, in itself, detrimental to an economy141. Quite the opposite, debt 
properly incurred, and used, is considered to be an excellent source of funding for an economy. 
There are, however, attendant risks related to the conditions attached to the issuing of debt as well 
as its management142. 
Currently, Africa borrows for a variety of reasons. To begin with, there are huge financing gaps, 
especially as far as infrastructure is concerned143. The African Development Bank (AfDB) reports 
that it estimates that the continent’s infrastructure needs about US $130 billion to US $170 billion. 
The financing gaps are at US $68 billion to US $108 billion144. Another reason that Africa has 
recently increased its borrowing, is the emergence of private markets as prominent lenders to 
African countries, owing to the low interest rates prevailing globally as a result of the 2008 
financial crisis145. Finally, the global financial crisis of 2008 resulted in an economic upheaval, 
with Africa taking a hard hit. The IMF reports that fiscal surpluses turned into deficits146. This 
accelerated debt uptake147. 
2.3. The Evolution of Sovereign Debt in Africa  
The profile of African debt has changed remarkably since the last debt crisis. The Brookings 
Institute’s Africa Growth Initiative148 notes that the design of the debt taken by Sub-Saharan 
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African countries is changing in a number of ways. To begin with, external debt has increased 
considerably in recent years. The share of commercial debt relative to that of concessional debt 
has increased. There is also more diversity in the lender base, as well as an increase in the 
prevalence of bond issuance. 
Traditionally, African countries borrowed from different categories, bilateral/official and 
multilateral agencies149. Bilateral debt refers to debt owed by one government to another150. Multi-
lateral agencies such as the IMF also offered credit to countries151.  Another source of sovereign 
debt has been private commercial lenders152. Now, African countries are moving towards market 
based debt153. An example of this is the investment in bonds, such as the Eurobond154. Reportedly, 
since 2006, a number of Sub-Saharan African countries such as Ghana, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Rwanda and Zambia have issued Eurobonds on international markets155. To contextualize the 
issue, the shift to market financing occurred very quickly. The Macroeconomic and Financial 
Management Institution of Eastern and Southern Africa (MEFMI) reports that in 2005 none of the 
countries mentioned above had participated in any international bond issue. By 2013, 21% of 
Zambia’s debt constituted such bonds, as well as 27% of Rwanda’s and 56% of Namibia’s156.  
Proponents of this kind of lending argue that there are considerable number of benefits of 
borrowing from private markets. To begin with, unlike the IMF and the World Bank, these lenders 
do not impose policy adjustments on the borrowing countries157. Additionally, borrowing from 
international markets may serve (in theory) to enhance government transparency owing to the 
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enhanced scrutiny by lenders158. Another benefit is the diversification of the debt portfolio159. The 
High Level Panel on Transforming Trust in the AfDB Group into Influence160 notes with concern 
that there are certain drawbacks to this kind of financing. First, Eurobonds have short maturities 
(7-12 years); considerably shorter than the period it takes for infrastructure projects to be 
completed. Further, interest rates for market bonds increase progressively with each issuance, 
which increases the risk of default for the borrowers. Finally, market finance seldom carries the 
conditions to build and maintain adequate fiscal and financial institutions which results in the 
absence of safeguards against default. 
Another new phenomenon of sovereign debt in Sub-Saharan Africa is the emergence of new 
bilateral lenders. Of note is China, which is now the largest bilateral creditor of many countries 
and is touted as the single most important creditor country in Africa161. China’s foray into Africa 
as a major lender is not by accident. Its new relationship with the continent is largely as a result of 
its ambitious infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative which ostensibly seeks to 
“promote connectivity of Asian, European and African continents.” 
Between 2005 and 2013, China’s portion of the total outstanding sovereign debt in Kenya went up 
from 1% to 8%162. In 2018, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics reported that the debt from 
China constituted 12.1% of the total national government debt, and had grown by 52.8% from the 
previous year163. Currently, the People’s Republic of China accounts for over 68% of Kenya’s 
total bilateral debt, making her the country’s largest bilateral creditor164.   
While some questions raised by Western countries about the increased lending by China to Sub-
Saharan Africa have been described as largely Sino-phobic165, some valid concerns have been 
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brought to the fore. First is the risk of odious debt. In countries with high levels of corruption, it is 
disconcerting that some of the monies from these loans will be diverted to private interests and 
will not support the projects they are earmarked for166. By way of example, in World Free Duty 
Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya167, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) decided that owing to bribery in the transaction, the contractual obligation incurred was 
void.  
A recent example where this is a cause for alarm is Kenya, where the Director of Public 
Prosecutions is investigating the diversion of channeling of funds from credit granted for the 
building of the railway line linking Nairobi to the port in Mombasa, into private pockets168. The 
opacity of Chinese debt provision is also a huge red flag as it is difficult to ascertain the 
effectiveness of the debt, and its affordability169. Another concern as a result of this ambiguity is 
that the implications of default are unclear. Global credit ratings firm Moody’s Investor Service 
reports that countries ‘with strategically important infrastructure’ like ports, such as Kenya, risk 
losing important assets in negotiations for credit with China170. In countries like Kenya where 
public participation in fiscal decisions is a constitutional precept171 and forms part of the national 
values, such opacity undermines this. 
From this discussion, it is clear that the evolving nature of African debt presents new benefits and 
more importantly, challenges. It is also evident that this needs to be taken into context when 
discussing its debt treatment in the event of a default. The implication of this shall be discussed 
further in chapter 3. 
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2.4. Africa’s debt crises of the 1980s172 
Unfortunately, Africa is not new to debt crisis. The first debt crisis experienced by Africa was in 
the 1980s173. Quite a number of reasons have been advanced to explain the occurrence of the crisis. 
To begin with, Cold War tensions precipitated a considerable amount of lending, to Western 
backed despots, with Western countries trying to court support for their ideologies in the region174. 
This was done, despite these Western powers knowing that these dictators were channeling this 
debt for their own use175. Thus, some African countries amassed debt as they accepted loans given 
in the 1970s, with the lenders paying no regard to the ability of these countries to repay. It has also 
been argued that some of these loans were given with a view to court the loyalty of corrupt regimes, 
with a great deal of these monies being funneled into the coffers of unrepresentative and repressive 
governments176.  
Mistry177 gives other probable causes of the crisis, including irresponsible lending by creditors, 
both private and official178; the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, where Africa’s oil exporters had their 
woes exacerbated by the fact that they had been far too easy targets for cheap credit; the global 
monetary shock which hit the world between 1979 and 1981 and induced  recession that lasted 
considerably longer in African countries, and resulted in the implosion of commodity markets and 
crash of prices; as well as the attendant vagaries of a prolonged drought between 1981 and 1984, 
which had a disproportional effect on agriculture reliant, weak African economies. Certainly, the 
rampant corruption and political instability that was characteristic of many post-colonial states did 
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not help matters and in fact contributed considerably to the crisis179. The situation was grave. 
Between 1982 and 1990, the debt had ballooned from US $140 billion, to over US $270 billion180. 
There was also a marked increase in foreign borrowing in the period preceding the debt crisis. This 
was as a result of the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979181 already mentioned. Non-oil producing 
countries on the continent had acute current account deficits and resorted to incremental debt. 
Simultaneously, international commercial banks had a lot of funds following the oil price hike of 
November, 1973, which they were anxious to recycle, and the cash-strapped African countries 
were an easy target for ill-thought lending182. After Mexico, in August 1982, announced that she 
was unable to service existing sovereign debt obligations, Argentina and Brazil followed suit. 
What followed was a debt crisis that hit the developing world, with Africa bearing the brunt of the 
aftermath183.  
A question arises, at this juncture. Is African debt distinguishable from other regions? After all, 
Latin American countries also suffered considerable debt burden in the 1980s184. Mistry185 appears 
to think so. He postulates that there was consensus, in the 1980s, that Africa’s debt problem 
particularly that taken up by Sub-Saharan Africa, requires special attention and treatment. He goes 
on to note the sub-Saharan debt problem was markedly dissimilar to those in other developing 
countries in Latin America, at the time. In terms of size, the debt was indubitably smaller than that 
of all developing countries. However, relative to the economies of the indebted countries, the debt 
ran the risk of crippling these countries. The discussion above on the evolution of Africa’s 
borrowing and resultant debt seems to confirm Mistry’s postulations on the uniqueness of the 
African situation.  
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Eventually, the debt crisis necessitated restructuring, which was done in subsequent years and 
which is discussed in Chapter 3 of this paper.  
2.5. Africa’s Looming Debt Crisis: False Alarm or Reality? 
It is not in question that since the global financial crisis of 2008186, African debt levels have been 
rising. While it is not all doom; Botswana, for example, has reported a decline in debt levels, 
recently187, there is cause for concern elsewhere. The IMF188 confirms that vulnerabilities are 
rising, and that 40% of low-income countries in the Sub-Saharan region are at risk of debt distress. 
Debt sustainability189 levels are also worrying190. Debt sustainability has deteriorated in a number 
of Sub-Saharan countries, and at the end of 2017, it was reported that some of these countries, 
Chad, Eritrea, Congo, Mozambique and South Sudan191 were assessed to be in debt distress192 with 
Zambia and Ethiopia, which had previously moderate ratings now changed to having a high risk 
of distress193. 
 
The International Financial Corporation194 of the World Bank explains that there is poor revenue 
collection in many African countries, which may constrain their capacity to service debts, and is 
likely to pose significant debt sustainability concerns. Because of this, high debt levels pose a 
serious concern and are a considerable vulnerability for the economies in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Debt relief activist organization Jubilee Debt Campaign195 (credited with helping to rally for debt 
forgiveness for highly indebted developing countries196) notes that a considerable number of 
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African countries like Zimbabwe, Ghana, Sudan, Zambia and quite sadly, Africa’s youngest 
country, South Sudan, were at risk of debt distress.  
According to the data collated by the AfDB, as from 2017, there is cause for concern. Below is an 
illustration of a group of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the corresponding risk of debt 
distress197: 





Comoros          (2019) 
Kenya              (2018)  
Benin              (2019)  
Burkina Faso (2018) 
Congo, DR        (2018)  
Congo, Rep (2018) 






Malawi             (2019)  
Mali                  (2017)  
Niger                (2017)  
Nigeria     (2018) 
Sierra Leone (2017) 
Togo                (2017) 
Burundi (2018) 
Cameroon (2017) 
Cabo Verde (2017) 





Mauritania       (2017) 
Chad (2017) 
Mozambique (2018) 




Gambia            (2019)  
São Tomé & Príncipe 
(2018)  
Zambia (2017) 
Somalia            (2017) 
 
Note: Debt risk is assessed on the basis of average scores of Country Policy and Institution 
Assessment framework created by the World Bank, [which assessment uses four clusters as a 
basis, to wit: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, 
and public sector management and institutions], as well as the size of debt and debt servicing as 
                                                          





debt burden indicators. Low risk is descriptive of countries that have all the debt burden 
indicators below the thresholds, moderate risk, of countries that are below the thresholds, but 
said thresholds may be breached if there are sudden changes in macroeconomic policies, and 
external shocks, such as currency volatility, while high risk describes countries that show a 
prolonged breach of debt-service thresholds, but currently not struggling with repayments198.  
Another dimension to this debt is the China factor. As discussed in this chapter, China has extended 
considerably huge amounts of credit to Africa. Concerns have been raised about the impact of this 
seemingly bottomless lending on debt sustainability, seeing as over-borrowing helped to foment 
the debt crisis in the 1980s199. The situation is further compounded by the rapacious corruption of 
certain regimes in Africa200. It is well documented that not all monies extended as loans by the 
Chinese government are being used for the intended purpose, which worsens debt sustainability. 
Indeed, even the Chinese government recognizes these issues as warranting action. Responding to 
concerns about debt distress risks, China has pledged to tackle sustainability issues tied to its 
lending. A statement from the Chinese embassy in Kenya given in 2017201 states: 
“China needs to keep an eye on certain African countries’ risks of external debt. Currently 
the sustainability of external debt is generally controllable, but we need to remain cautious 
about the possibility of a debt crisis in certain countries, such as Sudan, Zimbabwe, Ghana 
and Mozambique. Those countries’ development trends in external debt need timely 
analysis and evaluation, and precautions need to be taken when necessary. Regarding 
projects relating to Sino-African cooperation, China needs to pay special attention to 
projects that are guaranteed by the host countries and their governments’ solvency, and if 
necessary a mechanism of insurance needs to be introduced to avoid default on debt.” 
It is yet to be seen, what measures the People’s Republic of China will undertake to promote debt 
sustainability. The Chinese government has gone so far as to forgive Sino-African debt that had 
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posed challenges for repayment recently, in 2018202. It is therefore not debatable that there are 
disconcerting levels of debt in Africa. Given the situation, and the fact that in the last debt crisis203, 
debt treatment was offered to Africa when a considerable amount of damage had been done, a 
framework for sovereign debt restructuring is not just desirable; it is imperative204.  
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the African scenario with regard to debt, and has explained the nature 
of Africa’s borrowing, in relation to its economic history, as well as the attendant peculiarities. In 
line with Korobkin’s205 value based theory, this ought to inform any form of debt treatment that 
Sub-Saharan African countries may receive, paying due regard to the political, social and moral 
dimensions. Korobkin suggests that there exists a means of achieving Rawlsian rationality in 
bankruptcy (extrapolated here to include sovereign insolvency) decision making. He posits that 
the law of bankruptcy embodies “normative and deliberative constraints” that allow debt treatment 
to address issues arising among diverse values, contextually. In some situations, the debt treatment 
should reflect unchanging principles. In others, special consideration may be given to the particular 
characteristics of the case206.  
This chapter has also examined the most significant debt crisis that Africa has had, in the 1980s, 
with a view to contextualize the precipitating factors. This chapter has also illustrated the concerns 
about Africa’s current debt levels and debt sustainability. It acknowledges that debt treatment and 
relief for African countries is germane, given the current levels of debt exposures. All these factors, 
together, reveal a need to examine the current sovereign debt restructuring framework and examine 
its suitability or lack thereof, and if necessary propose a feasible, effective alternative. The next 
chapter will examine the frameworks currently available, and their suitability to the African 
situation. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE DECLINING EFFICACY OF PARIS AND LONDON   
CLUBS’ METHODS FOR RESTRUCTURING AFRICA’S DEBT 
3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the African debt situation. It considered the intricacies of lending 
for Sub-Saharan African countries, the debt crisis of the 1980s, as well as the rising levels of 
current debt, and the need to act pre-emptively to arrest any situation that may result in a systemic 
crisis. It is against that backdrop that this chapter will illustrate the various existing methods of 
sovereign debt restructuring, and whether they are suitable and efficient for the treatment of 
African debt. The research question this chapter will attempt to answer is whether the current 
methods for sovereign debt restructuring are sufficient. In doing so, it will examine the existing 
methods of debt restructuring, their process of treatment of debt, and its historical treatment of 
African debt. Against this, there will be an evaluation of current concerns regarding sovereign debt 
restructuring and debt relief for African countries.  
 
3.2. A note on terminology  
Before further inquiry, it is necessary to define certain economic terms that may be used in this 
chapter. ‘External debt’ refers to debt that is owed to creditors that are non-resident creditors and 
may be repaid in both foreign and domestic currency207. ‘Official debt’208 is debt owed to a bilateral 
government agency or a multilateral development agency. ‘Public debt’209 makes reference to the 
debt owed by the government or public sector agencies.  ‘Bilateral debt’210 refers to debt owed by 
one government to another. ‘Multilateral debt’211 refers to debt obligations to institutions such as 
the IMF and the World Bank. Finally, this chapter shall make reference to syndicated loans which 
describe loans that are given in concert, by several creditors212.  
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3.3. Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Primer  
When credit is extended, the resultant relationship is one of debtor-creditor213. This relationship 
creates a set of rights and obligations, and the most fundamental of these is the obligation on the 
debtor to make repayment (as well as interest, which operates typically as remuneration for the 
lender) as well as the creditor’s right to receive repayment214. Under municipal law, when a debtor 
does not honour its obligations to pay, the lender is availed of alternative methods of debt 
collection, either through remedies provided contractually or by statutory operation. Another 
remedy available is a scenario where parties come to an agreement on a new contractual framework 
for repayment of the loan215.  
 
Insolvency (cash flow) happens when there is an inability by the debtor to make good on payment 
of their debt216. The operation of insolvency law kicks in at this point. Here, it is important to 
illustrate what is considered to be a good bankruptcy/insolvency procedure. Finch217 observes that 
the law of bankruptcy/insolvency operates with a view to acknowledge and protect the interests of 
the debtors and creditors, as well as those of the society affected by the insolvency. Mugasha218 
contends that insolvency law’s success in dealing with debtor-creditor affairs is determined in 
evaluating its procedural efficiency, and by preventing exploitation of any parties involved. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Korobkin’s value based theory also considers bankruptcy law successful 
if it makes resolutions across diverse values and contexts, with a view to produce efficiency219.  
 
When a country becomes insolvent, such that it is unable to service its public debt, the country is 
said to be in debt distress220. Debt distress is heterogeneous in its effect. On debtor nations, in 
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particular, it affects social and economic programs with an adverse effect on the citizenry, and 
constrains meaningful participation in global trade221. Municipally, when a company is in distress, 
and there exists a desire to rehabilitate and rescue the company, the regime of insolvency law will 
provide a variety of ways to do so. This may include, among others, debt restructuring. In Kenya, 
this is dealt with under the Insolvency Act, 2015222. There is a comparable version, with sovereign 
debt. Sovereign debt restructuring involves the employment of measures to allow the debtor nation 
some respite223, with regard to repayment of the debt. It generally constitutes actions to renegotiate 
and modify the terms of credit, so as to improve the borrower’s chances of eventually repaying the 
loan224. The debtor receives concessions, typically in the form of extensions of deadlines for 
payment or debt cancellation for part of the debt225. Usually, it is more beneficial to a greater 
number of parties, than the spiraling of the debtor nation into greater economic turmoil because of 
rigid terms of repayment226. With this context, the next part of this chapter will consider the 
available methods of debt restructuring.  
 
3.4. The Paris Club  
3.4.1. Origin and nature of the Paris Club 
In the 1960s, following Argentina’s debt default, the Paris Club emerged as a leading group of 
bilateral creditors, to reschedule sovereign debt.227. Their first ad hoc meeting was in Paris in 1956, 
where the countries gathered to deal with Argentina’s debt default. Since 1979, the Club has had 
a permanent secretariat housed by the French Treasury. All the Club’s meetings take place in Paris. 
As at 2014, the Club comprised permanent membership of twenty countries228. The initial idea 
behind what was intended to be a transient cooperation was to provide relief to debtor countries 
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facing temporary liquidity problems229. The unintended effect of this continued rescheduling was 
that the debt burden of these debtor countries worsened since rescheduled interest was being 
treated as new debt230. Following the debt crisis of 80s, the Paris Club elected to increase debt 
relief to countries with struggling economies. Unlike the inaugural meetings, where creditors 
merely considered debt relief as a means to forestall liquidity problems, they increased the remit 
of the Club to include assisting said countries to reduce the burden of debt on their economies231. 
There are typically four types of parties that attend these meetings232:  
a. Delegates from the debtor country;  
b. Representatives of the creditors; 
c. The IMF, which plays an advisory role; and 
d. International organizations that are invited as observers and may include representatives 
from OECD, UNCTAD and AfDB. 
 
Korff-Schmising233 explains that typically, debt treated by the Club arises from contracts executed 
by, or guaranteed by one of the creditor government. The purview is usually limited to debts that 
have a term of more than a year. The Paris Club has several principles for restructuring sovereign 
debt234. The basic principle is that the country must be facing imminent default on debt service. 
Another condition is the agreement between the debtor’s government and the IMF that the country 
concerned will make use of the temporary relief to put into place necessary fiscal policy adjustment 
programs. The terms of the agreement for debt rescheduling are binding on all creditors, with no 
creditor receiving more favourable terms. Decisions are made by consensus, which radically 
reduces the risk of holdout creditors235 (lenders who are willing to break ranks with other creditors, 
typically in pursuit of better terms)236. The scope of the relief granted by the Club is typically wider 
                                                          
229 Vilanova JC, Martin M, The Paris Club, Debt Relief International Ltd, 2001, Publication No. 3, 1   
230 Vilanova JC, Martin M, The Paris Club, Debt Relief International Ltd, 2001, Publication No. 3, 1   
231 Vilanova JC, Martin M, The Paris Club, Debt Relief International Ltd, 2001, Publication No. 3, 2 
232 Vilanova JC, Martin M, The Paris Club, Debt Relief International Ltd, 2001, Publication No. 3, 2 
233 Korff-Schmising, “Rescheduling of the external debt: Paris Club” Debt restructuring, Dar es Salaam, 8 to 12 July 
1991, available on http://www.unitar.org/dfm  
234 Korff-Schmising, “Rescheduling of the external debt: Paris Club” Debt restructuring, Dar es Salaam, 8 to 12 July 
1991, available on http://www.unitar.org/dfm 
235 Buchheit L, Chabert G ,  DeLong C, Zettelmeyer J, The sovereign debt restructuring process, 4 September, 2018, 
8 






than that granted by commercial banks and in some incidences, may include rescheduling of both 
the principal and interest. The members are also required to treat each rescheduling according to 
the circumstances of the debtor, and to share information with each other.237 It is open to all 
creditor governments to whom the debtor country is indebted, provided that they are willing to 
adhere to all the Club’s practices listed above.  
 
3.4.2. The Restructuring Process  
The process begins by submitting a formal request to the Secretariat of the Club by the debtor 
nation. Thereafter, a negotiation meeting is set, and begins with a session where the statement of 
request by the country in debt is presented238. The purpose of the statement is to illustrate the need 
for debt relief. It contains information of the situation with regard to balance of payment, data on 
debt sustainability and the economic performance predictions of the country. The IMF then 
provides an evaluation of the debtor country’s economic situation239. It is worth noting that only 
requests supported by the IMF will be considered by the IMF. Deliberations continue thereafter, 
with only the creditor countries and the IMF present. Terms to be offered to the debtor are 
established, noting, as stated above that the proposal has to be agreed upon by consensus. Should 
the debtor suggest modifications, they are conveyed to the creditochinars by the Chair of the 
Club240. The end result of this process is a document referred to as “Agreed Minutes”. This 
document, containing the terms of the rescheduling, is not legally binding. However, each 
government is expected to honour it in good faith241.  
 
3.5. Historical Treatment of African Debt  
Following the 80s debt crisis, African nations required debt restructuring for their bilateral debt242. 
Requests from African countries for debt restructuring from Paris Club creditors were considerable 
in amount by the end of the 1970s. The countries seeking relief included Sudan, Uganda and Sierra 
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Leone. Reportedly, by the end of 1986, the debt of 22 Sub-Saharan African countries had been 
restructured243. Notably, the Club restructured previously rescheduled claims, in the period 
between 1973 and 1986. This was owing to an untenable principle at the time, that debts once 
rescheduled, would not be rescheduled again244.   
 
As explained by Peter245, the Paris Club recognized that its terms were untenable and at a summit 
in Toronto in 1988, they proposed a reconsideration of terms. They agreed that African debtor 
countries would receive relief through three options (these were known as the Toronto terms). The 
writing off or forgiveness of debt comprising a third of what was owed, with the remainder being 
paid over a period of stipulated time, a rescheduling of all outstanding debt over a 14 year period 
of repayment, with a grace period of 8 years, and a reduced interest rate, and finally, rescheduling 
the debt over 25 years, after the granting of a 14 year grace period, with interest at market rates246. 
This was applied in negotiations with countries like Tanzania (2002)247 and Uganda (2000)248. 
Further engagement of Sub-Saharan Africa included the further application of lower interest rates 
on the existing debt, with longer repayment and grace periods. Somalia and Uganda benefited from 
this249.  
 
An example of an unsavoury engagement between the Paris Club and a Sub-Saharan African 
country is its debt treatment of Nigeria250. Nigeria began experiencing debt servicing problems in 
1985. By the time she had finished servicing the initial debt, its external debt had grown even 
greater251. The reason for this, was that even when commercial creditors agreed to restructure her 
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debt, the Paris Club refused to restructure the debts owed to them by Nigeria. The reason given 
was that Nigeria had run afoul of the policy requirements laid out by the IMF252. In 2005, President 
Obasanjo and Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala announced that Nigeria had finally received 
debt relief, with the Paris Club implementing its first discounted buyback253. In this scenario, 
Nigeria paid off its entire bilateral debts at once, but at a steep discount254. By this time, however, 
Nigeria, was the continent’s most indebted nation, holding US $36 billion in external debt255.  
 
The Paris Club clearly has a somewhat chequered history with African debtor nations. It has, in 
fact, been described as being ill suited to reschedule African debts. Mistry256 goes as far as to say 
that it was unable to deal with the debt relief needs of Sub-Saharan Africa. Some of the criticisms 
levelled against the Paris club include the imposition of unrealistic scheduling terms for Sub-
Saharan countries, which led to build up of debt. It has also been accused of being inordinately 
slow to allow debt relief for Latin American and African countries during the 1980s debt crisis257. 
 
3.6. The London Club  
3.6.1. Origin and Nature of the London Club 
Developing countries, in the 1970s, borrowed from commercial banks. This debt mostly took the 
form of syndicated loans258. When debt service by these governments became untenable, bank 
advisory committees (BACs) were formed to restructure the debt. The negotiations addressed debt 
owed by Zaire, Sudan, Poland, Turkey and Peru259. When this process was repeatedly applied in 
later defaults, it was (in a somewhat misleading manner as not all negotiations were conducted in 
London) labelled “the London Club”260. It has now come to be used to refer to negotiations held 
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between commercial lenders and debtor nations. This is usually done by establishing as ad hoc 
bank advisory committee (described as a “communications link” between the debtor and the 
international banking community261) or a creditor committee262. The membership of the committee 
varied depending on the size of a bank’s debt exposure, and the need for representation. Usually, 
only the initial amounts lent were rescheduled, with the requirement that the arrears be paid at the 
time the agreement to restructure came into effect. Sometimes, the creditors extended fresh credit 
to the debtor nations263.  
 
Reportedly, in the period between 1980 and 1988, US $18.7 billion owed to commercial bank by 
low income countries was subjected to a debt restructuring mechanism, with countries like Côte 
d'Ivoire, Nicaragua, Sudan and Nigeria seeming to account for 85% of the entire amount264.  
 
3.6.2. The Restructuring Process  
The process of restructuring debt with the London Club begins with a debtor nation defaulting, 
and is subsequently unable to borrow on international markets265. The debtor country then reaches 
out to a one or two of its major bank lenders, and seeks to have them organize and chair a 
committee meeting. These committees do not operate under any set of rules of procedures, and 
their formation do not require statutory or contractual underpinnings266. The role of the BACs 
revolves around the establishment of procedures that would govern the negotiations, ascertaining 
the authenticity of data provided by the debtor to support the request for restructuring, assessing 
the debtor country’s fiscal reform efforts, negotiate the terms of the debt treatment, as well as 
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drafting the documentation, sells the terms of the restructuring to non-committee members267. The 
outcome of the process, there is an “agreement in principle”, which contains the terms agreed 
upon. The members of the BAC then need to approve the agreement268. Usually, unanimity is 
imperative, and in the alternative, approval by banks that are responsible for at least 95% of the 
debt. Contrary to the outcome of the Paris Club discussed in this chapter (agreed minutes), the 
agreement that is produced by this process, once formally ratified, is legally binding on all 
members269.  
 
Notably, of the biggest drawbacks with the London Club process, is the presence of holdouts and 
disputes among creditors. In fact, it is reported that among the restructurings effected by the 
London Club, 30% dealt with inter-creditor wrangles that resulted in delays in implementing 
agreements270. Examples include dissension by Bankers Trust in Algeria’s restructuring in 1992, 
Lloyds bank resisting an agreement in Argentina in 1982, as well as Citibank in Chile in 1987271. 
 
3.7. Historical Treatment of African Debt  
By the end of 1990, the total debt owed by African countries to London Club editors was estimated 
to be US $23.4 billion, with Sub-Saharan Africa accounting for US $15 billion of this. By this 
time, there was forty commercial debt rescheduling agreements on the continent272. As indicated 
above, the London Club’s initial terms were that only the principal amounts were rescheduled, and 
the arrears paid off before the agreement was performed. However, it became apparent that the 
debt crisis in the 80s was systemic and debt owed to commercial creditors could not be dealt with 
by simply rescheduling principal payments. Additionally, concerted lending became difficult to 
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arrange273. In fact, by the late 1980s, many developing countries had been in default for an entire 
decade274.  
 
As a result of this, it became evident that debt reduction might be necessary. The Brady Plan was 
implemented. Named for the US Treasury Secretary who announced it in 1989, Nicholas Brady, 
it was spurred into fruition because there was concern about solvency of debtor countries, 
particularly those in developing regions. The Plan enjoyed support by the IMF and World Bank275. 
The crux of the Brady Plan appeared to be the parlaying of bank loans into new sovereign bonds, 
which enjoyed part securitization by US Treasury bonds, to offer creditors participating in 
restructurings an array of options, which would allow them to choose from different new debt 
instruments, and the writing off of interest owed to commercial banks276. The most notable African 
beneficiaries of the Brady Plan were Morocco, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire277.  
 
3.8. Other Forms of Debt Relief 
There were other forms of debt relief following the 80s debt crisis. This was necessitated by the 
fact that notwithstanding bilateral debt relief efforts, the debts of a considerable number of low-
income countries were too high to service278. Because of this, the Bretton Woods institutions, the 
IMF and the World Bank, who were also major creditors of low-income countries came up with 
the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) Initiative, to deal with multilateral debt279. The key 
principles underpinning were that debt sustainability was to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, 
that debt relief would only be granted when the debtor indicated that the relief was to be put to 
good use, that the mechanisms to deal with debt sustainability should be developed, broad creditor 
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participation, and that new financing to beneficiary countries would be provided on concessional 
terms280. Another debt relief initiative set up by multilateral agencies was the Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative (MDRI) was intended to supplement the HIPC. It seeks two major objectives, to 
wit, to increase debt relief to HIPC countries, to support their realization of Millennium 
Development Goals, while contemporaneously safeguarding the financial well-being of 
international financial institutions, as well as encouraging the allocative efficiency of donor 
resources by placing them in low income countries with demonstrable good policy performance281.    
As at September, 2014, debt relief packages for 36 countries had been approved under the HIPC 
Initiative and MDRI, with 30 of these countries being in Africa282. The benefits of these initiatives 
for African countries cannot be gainsaid. There was a remarkable decline in public debt held by 
Sub-Saharan African countries after the implementation of HIPC and MDRI283. Nonetheless, it is 
noted for the purposes of this paper that these initiatives do not carry a guarantee of replication284.  
 
3.9. Concerns Presented  
This chapter has discussed the existing methods of sovereign debt restructuring that have been 
used to grant relief to African countries. This chapter also seeks to ascertain whether these methods 
have any viability, at this point, given the peculiarities of African debt discussed in Chapter 2, as 
well as other concerns that will be addressed below.  
3.9.1. Creditor lawsuits and vulture funds  
With any debt restructuring mechanism, creditor holdouts present a huge concern285. They delay 
the process, worsening the indebtedness of the debtor. As discussed above, the London Club has 
been beguiled with a creditor holdout problem. Recent developments do not make things any 
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better. The years subsequent to the 1980s debt crisis and the resultant debt restructuring, have 
witnessed an increase in creditor litigation286. Creditors have been breaking rank with other 
creditors and going to court to realize their debts. An example of this is the case between the DRC 
(then Zaire) and FG Hemisphere LLC287. The DRC had entered into a contract with a Yugoslav 
company to construct a hydro-electric facility in 1980 and 1986. Owing to the political upheavals 
faced by DRC during the period that Mobutu Sese Seko was at the helm of the country, the country 
was in massive debt distress and defaulted on its obligations288. In 2003, two arbitral institutions 
handed down awards against the DRC requiring her to pay the principal loans, as well as the 
interest accruing. Thereafter, investment fund known as FG Hemisphere LLC bought the debts 
from the Yugoslav company. In 2010, while DRC received massive debt relief through the HIPC 
Initiative discussed above, FG Hemisphere broke ranks with other creditors and sued DRC to 
recover what was owed to the Yugoslav company under the original loan contract289.  
 
The emergence of vulture funds has further worsened things.  The AfDB describes vulture funds 
as entities that seek to buy distressed debt, sell it at a value that is considerably lower than what it 
is worth, and then seek to realize the full amount, often times through litigation290.  This was 
illustrated in the case of Camdex International Ltd. v. Bank of Zambia291 where the vulture fund 
bought the sovereign debt, reduced it into a judgment debt, and then went ahead to freeze the 
debtor’s assets, so as to enforce its claim, whilst a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism was 
ongoing. A more recent global development has further complicated sovereign debt restructuring 
with commercial lenders. The US Federal Courts in New York interpreted a pari passu clause (a 
principle in insolvency law denoting the designation of all unsecured creditors in an insolvency 
process as entitled to share equally in the available assets of the insolvent, in proportion to the 
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claim of each lender292) in cross-border debt instrument to justify granting of an injunction that 
required Argentina to pay holdout creditors ratably with any payments that were made to countries 
that did indeed grant the sovereign borrower debt relief293.  This decision has been seen to 
encourage holdout behaviour, during sovereign debt restructuring which is damaging to the debt 
restructuring framework, and the debtor nation294.  
 
Such cases, have been considered to be an obstacle to sovereign debt restructurings and debt relief, 
particularly in low income countries295. Given the fragilities of African economies discussed in 
Chapter 3, it would not be an exaggeration to state that this would further exacerbate the debt 
distress in an African economy. The proliferation of holdout behaviour and litigation also 
diminishes the efficiency of the London Club method of restructuring.  
 
3.9.2. Emergence of new bilateral lenders  
As discussed in Chapter 2, there has been an emergence of new bilateral lenders. In Africa, chief 
among these is China. China is a non-Paris club country and as such has no obligation to participate 
in debt rescheduling exercises, or to observe its rules and practices296. While China has relaxed its 
erstwhile hostile stance against the Paris Club creditors297, there does not exist any indication that 
she will work with other bilateral lenders to restructure sovereign debt298. In the absence of a 
framework within which to deal with Sino-African debt, there is no way of knowing how each 
debt treatment will be treated, which portends trouble for African nations saddled with Chinese 
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debt299. This also served to render the Paris Club method of restructuring sovereign debt rather 
redundant in the face of these shifts in lender base300. 
 
3.9.3. Sovereign bonds 
As illustrated in chapter 2, African countries are increasingly turning to international capital 
markets to supplement their debt financing. Countries such as Kenya, Zambia, Ghana and Namibia 
have issued Eurobonds on the financial markets301. The potential benefits of such financing have 
been already discussed. There are however mounting concerns about the risks of such financing, 
also discussed earlier. In relation to sovereign debt restructuring, the greater risk is that in the event 
of default, there is no clear way through which to restructure these private debts302. A number of 
African countries have already showed signs of experiencing sovereign bond debt distress. 
Seychelles has already defaulted on a US $230 million bond303. Kenya is also experiencing 
difficulties with repaying its first sovereign bond.304 The London Club is evidently insufficient to 
restructure sovereign bond debts, considering its existing creditor cooperation concerns305. As 
such, the need to restructure African debt held through bonds, will be faced with problems of 
coordination and expensive litigation, which would further worsen the state of a struggling 
economy.306 There is therefore need to establish a framework that will comprehensively treat debt 
held through sovereign bonds. 
3.10. Conclusion 
This chapter has evaluated the existing sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms and has examined 
their interaction with Africa debt, historically. The Paris Club and London Club have restructured 
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African debt previously. Multilateral agencies have also offered debt relief to African countries. 
However, given the changing landscape of sovereign debt to include more diverse lenders, and 
different debt instruments, it is clear that there is a dearth of sufficient debt restructuring 
mechanisms307. 
The chief question this chapter undertook to answer, is whether these mechanisms are suitable and 
sufficient to address African debt, even with the developments that have been highlighted herein. 
From the evaluation done, they appear to come up short. Given that African countries may require 
sovereign debt restructuring in the not too distant future308, it is imperative that stakeholders, who 
include bilateral, multilateral and commercial lenders, as well as debtor nations, evaluate a suitable 
mechanism for restructuring their debts. It is imperative that these mechanisms to be considered, 
be efficient, timely, and pay due consideration to the peculiarities of each circumstance.  
The next chapter will examine possible alternatives to already existing sovereign debt restructuring 
procedures.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: TOWARDS A HYBRID FRAMEWORK FOR DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING 
4.1. Introduction  
Chapter two of this thesis investigated the distinct nature of African borrowing, and as a result, her 
debt burden. The peculiarities of African debt, past and present, have been illustrated. It also 
examined the continent’s rising debt levels, and the likelihood that some African countries will 
need avenues to restructure untenable debt, and soon. Flowing from this, Chapter 3 examined the 
existing methods of sovereign debt restructuring and their sufficiency to restructure debt held by 
countries in Africa. Owing to the said methods’ inefficiencies, as well other emerging set of 
conditions that render these mechanisms even more inadequate to restructure African debt, it was 
demonstrated that they were not well suited to restructure African debt309.  
 
Drawing from this, this chapter considers three pertinent questions: the structure of a hybrid 
framework for debt restructuring, whether such a framework is feasible, and finally, whether this 
framework will afford African countries, the relief they so seek. In doing so, this chapter attempts 
to answer the question that informs this thesis, “Is a hybrid framework for sovereign debt 
restructuring the answer to sovereign debt relief for African countries?” This chapter will 
interrogate the ability of such a framework to offer timely, efficient and less costly debt relief. It 
will begin by examining the objectives of a new framework for sovereign debt restructuring as 
envisioned by Korobkin310, with a view to producing a timely and efficient system, that affords 
relief to debtors, value to creditors, and does so while taking into account the peculiarities of the 
circumstances that the debtor nation finds itself in. Thereafter, it will look at the proposed 
components of the framework separately, and illustrate the benefits thereof, to a regime of 
sovereign debt restructuring, as well as possible causes for concern. It will also evaluate the 
possible structure of such a system for debt restructuring. Finally, it will address the suitability of 
said framework for purposes of debt restructuring.  
 
                                                          
309 Brooks S, Lombardi D, Suruma E, ‘African perspectives on sovereign debt restructuring’, CIGI’s Global 
Economy Program, Kampala, 7 August 2014. Available at CIGI, 8 






4.2. Objectives of a New Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring  
There is need for a new framework for sovereign debt restructuring. This study, has at length, 
attempted to illustrate that. But what would the objectives for such a framework be? To begin with, 
it would be necessary to examine the conceptual underpinnings for good system of debt 
restructuring. As stated, Korobkin311 argues that it is difficult to provide a single scaffolding on 
which the lot of an insolvent is resolved. Each incident of financial distress is unique in its context, 
and this ought to be taken into account when offering debt treatment. The handling of an incident 
of insolvency ought to have a comprehensive, multifaceted approach that optimizes value for all 
participants312.  
 
Nudelsman313 suggests that sovereign debt restructuring ought to have three invariable 
characteristics; efficiency, orderliness and predictability. She notes that to achieve this, 
coordination amongst creditors, as well as information sharing is imperative. Perhaps it is 
important to register that she urges that it ought to be at the centre of all considerations that a loss 
on the side of a debtor ought to be avoided, as the alternative results in destruction of value, from 
which none of the parties derive any resultant benefit, seeing as a debtor’s loss produces no gain 
for the creditors. It is therefore pertinent to a sovereign debt restructuring system to preserve, in as 
far as is possible, the value of the debtor’s resources, not just for the creditors, but the debtor itself. 
 
4.3. Statutory Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
One of the propositions for a system of sovereign debt restructuring has been the creation of a 
statutory mechanism of dealing with sovereign debt restructuring. This method was proposed by 
former IMF Chief Krueger314, who advocated for the creation of a statutory based approach, which 
would create the SDRM, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism. In her estimation, the 
establishment of a universal treaty for obligations, would ensure uniformity of procedure, by 
giving the remit of standardizing interpretation to one institution, and would facilitate the creation 
of a sole international body with the power to deal with disputes and oversee voting among 
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creditors. According to this proposal, the mechanism would allow for a moratorium in place once 
payments are suspended, create mechanisms to protect creditors’ interests during the moratorium, 
and would allow for provision of new financing by private creditors during the proceedings, as 
well as a provision to have the creditors bound by an agreement that has been approved by a 
specified majority315. Further, the claims to be restructured through the SDRM would be classified 
in the text of the treaty establishing the SDRM. As such, the classes created would be limited to 
those where it is possible to make general, ex ante decisions based on the seniority of claims (for 
example, unsecured or secured claims) as well as the interests of the types of creditors (for 
example, state versus private lenders)316.  
 
The IMF has postulated that objective of the SDRM would be to establish a framework that 
incentivizes the debtor nation and its creditors, to act collaboratively and promptly to arrive at an 
agreement on the restructuring of unsustainable debt317. The envisaged goal would be the 
preservation of the economic value of the debtor nation’s resources and a facilitation of the nation’s 
status to viability, and as such, reduce the cost of the process318. Further, creditor interests were 
seen to be balanced as per the proposal by IMF, the debtor nation would be disallowed from 
making any payment to non-priority creditors319. Additionally, the IMF would exercise oversight 
over the debtor nation’s ability to diminish her resources, which would result in the preservation 
of value for the creditors, policy wise320. Additionally, proponents of this mechanism have 
contended that it would strengthen creditor coordination, which would encourage debtor nations 
and their creditors to reschedule unsustainable debt, before default was the only option, and in 
doing so, promoting the idea of early prevention of distress321. Another considerably attractive 
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feature of this method is that it would deal with any arising threat of litigation by dissenting 
creditors, as they would not have an alternative forum through which to litigate322. The SDRM 
method got support from some quarters. Notable, was China, a key bilateral lender. Around 
September 2002 the governor of the Chinese central bank, Dai, submitted at before the IMF 
Committee, that an effective SDRM would help forestall and resolve debt crises323.  
 
Some criticisms have been levelled against this proposed method. The biggest concern has been 
that of the creation of moral hazard324. It has been argued that if there is an orderly, predictable 
and rapid restructuring process, the result will be a reduction of the cost of default, which will 
provide a perverse incentive to debtor nations to borrow irresponsibly325. Another perceived 
drawback of the proposal was that there was no provision of either an automatic stay on litigation 
by disgruntled creditors, or an automatic moratorium on payments and that these options would 
only be available after voting by a majority of creditors326. Further, there remains fear of bad faith 
on the part of some powerful Western creditors who may enforce terms onerous to sovereign 
debtors, which may eventually become law327.  
 
Finally, the US remained disconcerted by the notion that the SDRM would run afoul of the 
contractual claims of its investors, and further that the jurisdiction of its domestic courts would be 
curtailed by the dispute resolution body to be formed within the SDRM328. The IMF anticipated 
that given the attractive features of this model to both debtors and creditors, the proposal would 
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not be met with recalcitrance329. They were wrong. Owing to opposition by the US, the proposal 
was shelved330.  
 
An alternative statutory approach has been proposed, with the enacting of complementary 
legislation nationally. This would involve the amendment of the articles creating the IMF, and the 
further establishment of new treaty obligations. As such, the member countries will require 
legislative amendments to their municipal frameworks, to give the amendment full force331.  
 
However, should there be some countries that refuse to adopt the necessary legislation, the key 
attractive features of this proposal which are uniformity and universality would be sacrificed332. 
After the difficulties faced by Argentina while restructuring its debt, which were discussed in 
Chapter 3, calls for the SDRM approach have been renewed333. 
 
4.4. Contractual Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
This approach involves having negotiations between creditors and debtors, under the conditions 
that are provided in the debt contracts creating their relationship334. Eichengreen335 states, 
however, that these inter-creditor relations are governed by incomplete contracts, which have no 
provisions for communication centres for bondholders and creditors, no prohibition on disruptive 
litigation, and no allowance for a majority vote by creditors on changes in payment terms. He 
argues that it is for that reason that it is difficult to restructure sovereign debt under the existing 
institutional mechanisms. The absence of such contractual rules makes creditor coordination 
                                                          
329 Muriungi M, ‘Towards a legal framework on sovereign debt restructuring: A developing countries’ perspective’ 
Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Nairobi, 14 November, 2016 
330 Eichengreen B, ‘Restructuring sovereign debt’ 17 Journal of Economic Perspectives (2003) 89 
331 International Monetary Fund, The design of the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism—Further 
considerations, 27 November, 2002, 13 
332 Eichengreen B, ‘Restructuring sovereign debt’ 17 Journal of Economic Perspectives (2003) 89 
333 Lastra RM, Bodellini M, ‘Soft law and sovereign debt’ Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Financing for 
Development, Geneva, 7-9 November, 2018, 13 available at 
https://unctad.org/meetings/en/Contribution/SOFT%20LAW%20AND%20SOVEREIGN%20DEBT.pdf 
334 ‘Multilateral debt restructuring mechanism’ Ad hoc Committee on a multilateral legal framework for a sovereign 
debt restructuring, New York, 3 February, 2015 available at 
https://unctad.org/meetings/en/Presentation/gds_sd_2015-02-03-05_Ocampo_en.pdf  





extremely difficult, and as such, the restructuring of debt a painfully costly procedure that is also 
unpredictable336.  
 
In 1996, a G10337 Working Group produced the Rey Report338, proposing, inter alia, the inclusion 
of Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds. The term refers to provisions in bonds 
that allow the holders of a qualified majority (75%) to restructure the debt and amend terms of 
payment, and make them binding on the majority. In essence, they create an allowance for majority 
creditors to effect a “cram-down339” on dissenting creditors340.  This method has been preferred in 
recent years, and particularly, in dealing with the holdout problem341.  
 
There are however a number of concerns with regard to the use of CACs. Their much touted 
effectiveness has been brought into question. It has been argued that to be truly effective as a debt 
restructuring mechanism, CACs would need to be included in each of a debtor nation’s bond 
issues, which could take years, yet maturity periods for the bonds being issued are quite short.342 
Another weakness of these clauses is that they are not applicable to the debtor nation’s other debt, 
such as bank loans, debts owed to creditors, and trade debt343. Another concern that has been raised 
is that the weakening of creditor rights might cause investors to reject contracts with CACs344.  
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Finally, a purely contractual approach may deal with creditor coordination problems and make the 
process cheaper and faster but does nothing in so far as dealing with externalities of each situation.  
While it is desirable to do so, it is not possible to foist wider public policy objectives such as issues 
of debt sustainability in individual contracts345. This is considered another limitation of a purely 
contractual approach, and is particularly pertinent while addressing treatment of African debt. As 
such, it has been argued that they should not be considered a sufficient alternative to a more 
comprehensive approach to debt restructuring346.  
 
Another contractual device for sovereign debt restructuring is called the “exit consent clause” 
which allows a majority of bondholders participating in an exchange offer, to change important 
non-payment terms in the old bonds so as to reduce their value, as they exit which encourages 
participation in the exchange347. Finally, a contractual device for sovereign debt restructuring is 
the use of the pari passu clause. In sovereign debt restructuring, there are three types of pari passu 
clauses348. One that makes all bonds rank equally with all other unsecured sovereign debt, one that 
ranks all bonds equally in priority of payment, and one that ranks all bonds equally, and makes 
them payable on a pro rata basis349. The intended purpose of pari passu clauses in sovereign debt 
instruments was to discourage dissension and competition among creditors350. However, they seem 
to have become tools for vulture funds in holdout litigation, as was in the case of NML v 
Argentina351.  
4.5. Designing a Hybrid Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
From the discussion in this chapter, it is apparent that both the contractual approach, and the 
proposed statutory method have attractive features to make sovereign debt restructuring efficient 
and timely. It is also clear, there are drawbacks to both methods. It is also evident that there is a 
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need to come up with a system for debt restructuring that is an adequate alternative to the existing 
ad hoc framework that is quite fragmented and inefficient352.  
 
There have been proposals advocating the creation of framework that combines key attractive 
elements of both the contractual and statutory approaches, in order to have a formal framework 
that hinges on the complementarities of both methods to restructure debt efficiently, taking into 
account inclusivity, comprehensiveness and conclusiveness353. Indeed, a number of countries 
agree that there should be a complementary, comprehensive framework to restructure sovereign 
debt. This is clear from the fact that the creation of a multinational legal framework was supported 
overwhelmingly as reflected in the passing of a UN resolution on the same, passed in September, 
2014354. The framework should ideally put in place mechanisms that would solve disputes fairly, 
while complementing contractual approaches355.  
 
There also exist several opinions on what such a framework would look like. Two proposals for 
the structure of such a framework, stand out, for the purposes of this study.  
 
The first is championed by Guzman and Stiglitz356. They contend that given the inefficiencies of 
current mechanisms should impel the creation of a framework where the contractual approach is 
complemented by a multinational legal framework that carries out restructurings based on 
principles of “efficiency and equity”357. To deal with the inability of the earlier proposed SDRM 
to garner sufficient political support, it is proposed that a body, which will be tasked with the 
procedural framework, as well as dispute resolution be established under the auspices of the United 
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Nations358, although membership of parties be made voluntary359 but with the inculcation of 
contractual clauses in the debt contracts in order to ensure creditor coordination360. 
 
Guzman and Stiglitz propose that such a framework should have these key features, to wit: it 
should acknowledge, recognize and seek to complement the constraints of the private contractual 
approach. The framework must recognize the limitations of the private contractual approach, while 
ensuring reasonably fair treatment to both the debtor and creditors. Quite importantly for African 
debtor nations, given the peculiarities discussed in chapter 2, they recommend that such a 
framework take into account the “primacy” of the functions of the debtor nation, and its obligations 
to the citizens361. Additionally, such a framework should prioritize restructuring in timely way, by 
disincentivizing delays. To this end, there should be specific deadlines for the different stages of 
the process, to make the process more predictable362. They further propose that this framework 
take into account the peculiarities of the debtor nation’s economic situation when dealing with 
debt crises solution, and should do so by promoting the reform of fiscal policies363.  Finally, to 
deal with the issue of creditor litigation, they advise that the framework should promote the 
incorporation of contractual clauses of stays for litigation, prohibiting litigious creditors and 
vulture funds from derailing the debt restructuring process to the detriment of the debtors364. 
Overall, they consider a comprehensive debt restructuring system to be one that includes the 
implementation of a statutory approach at a multinational level. This approach will help to 
“complete” the contractual approach365.  
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Another proposal is the creation of Sovereign Debt Tribunal. This method proposes to incorporate 
certain components of the SDRM, with contractual provisions. Essentially, it envisages that the 
creation of an arbitration panel that would deal with debt restructuring disputes, and the reference 
thereto would be based on a contractual agreement between the sovereign debtor and its creditors, 
and would be specified in the debt instrument at the time of agreement, well before the debtor 
nation experiences debt service difficulties366. The jurisdiction of this panel would be delineated 
by the operation of contractual clauses in the debt contracts, with such clauses containing the 
events that would trigger the said jurisdiction367. The SDT would have several advantages. There 
would be consensus based among stakeholders, and as such improve the perception of fairness and 
legitimacy368. Further, the arbitration panel would serve as a neutral forum to arbitrate any creditor-
debtor and creditor-creditor disputes369. To promote such neutrality, this forum would be under 
the umbrella of a multilateral institution that is not a creditor itself. The United Nations was 
proposed as a probable candidate for this role370.  
 
Additionally, the binding authority of such a panel would overcome the coordination problems 
faced by other sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms, as well as curb the proliferation of 
creditor litigation. Finally, the institution would create predictability of procedure, which as 
discussed, is an attractive feature of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism.371 For purposes of 
this discussion, this approach looks attractive for African economies, as it would save on costs 
incurred during protracted, unpredictable processes, which exacerbate situations of distress372.  
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It is easy to see why this would be attractive to African debtor nations. The predictability, as stated, 
would save time and costs. The limiting of litigation would forestall a situation such as the one 
faced by the DRC when seeking to reschedule and restructure its debt. At a time when African 
economies are dealing with the possibility of debt distress, these reforms would be welcome.  
 
The chief concern when it comes to this proposal of a multifaceted system of sovereign debt 
restructuring is that there are concerns about political support of the same. However, this cannot 
mean that stakeholders abandon the quest for reforms. As it has been reiterated, the current 
mechanisms, and indeed, are not sufficient to deal with debt restructuring and it is imperative that 
reforms are initiated. 
4.6. Conclusion 
The statutory approach to resolving debt restructuring does not enjoy the political support it would 
need for its implementation373. And yet, the contractual approach does not suffice. In fact, even 
with improvements, the method would still fall short of a comprehensive, efficient debt 
restructuring mechanism374. Previous chapters have illustrated that reforms to the debt 
restructuring regime, or lack thereof, is of utmost importance. This chapter, drawing from the 
foregoing has demonstrated the insufficiencies of the alternatives proposed. It has considered the 
question of what reforms that provide solutions to this would be. In this respect, a conclusion has 
been made that a system that has a formal institution that deals with creation and standardization 
of procedures, as well as dispute resolution, is imperative. This system should be complemented 
by the use of contractual clauses to bind parties to the process, and to deal with the problem of 
creditor litigation, as well as make provisions for moratoria.  
As far as the institution proposed to be tasked with the creation of such an entity, the United 
Nations appears to be a lead contender. Such a framework, one that is comprehensive, and 
predictable, will save on time, and costs, which would be beneficial to debtor nations, and 
particular African economies that seek to forestall any eventualities that would deepen their debt 
difficulties. In all, the chapter found that whatever form a hybrid, multilateral and multifaceted 
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framework for sovereign debt restructuring would take, it appears to be the best option for a 








CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Introduction  
The substratum of this research is that there does not exist an adequate framework to restructure 
debt held by sovereigns. The existing mechanisms are inefficient in cost, and in time. They are not 
comprehensive and able to restructure sovereign debt effectively. Further, this is of particular 
concern to African countries holding sovereign debt. The reason for this distinction was evaluated, 
noting that African debtor nations require sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms that take into 
account the distinguishing characteristics of debt held by African countries, as well as her fraught 
economic history. For this reason, there is need of a formal, comprehensive, debt restructuring 
framework.  
To arrive at a conclusion, the thesis made several inquiries such as: is debt held by African 
countries distinguishable from other sovereign debt? What are the existing mechanisms of 
sovereign debt restructuring? Are they effective? If not, what improvements can be made, to 
benefit debtor nations, and in particular, those on the continent?  
This chapter concludes the thesis, presents the findings of this research and makes 
recommendations. It also highlights some areas of possible future study. 
5.2.  Findings 
After considering the African debt situation, as well as the conceptual underpinnings for 
reformation to the current sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms, and having considered the 
structure of the proposed reforms, these findings have been made: 
5.2.1. The debt situation faced and experienced by African nations, is distinguishable from 
debt held by other countries.  
In Chapters one and two, the study revealed that indeed, African debt is distinguishable from debts 
held by other sovereigns. It attributed this to the legacy of colonialism, global financial periods of 
distress, such as the one in the 1980s, as well as current shifting global trends with regard to debt 
financing. The study found that owing to this, a case could be made for the establishment of a 





these factors. Additionally, it found that there is need to address Africa’s debt sustainability so as 
to avoid distress. 
5.2.2. The current debt restructuring mechanisms are insufficient  
In chapter three, the current most notable frameworks for debt restructuring were evaluated. The 
Paris Club has been used to restructure sovereign debt, which is owed to bilateral creditors. 
Similarly, the London Club has been the forum, albeit an ad hoc one to restructure debt owed to 
commercial lenders. The two fora are inadequate to restructure sovereign debt. Additionally, with 
the emergence of new bilateral creditors, who are not its members, the Paris Club appears to be 
fading in relevance. In likewise fashion, the emergence of bondholders, and vulture funds, as well 
as creditor litigation, the London Club is facing a similar fate, with regard to relevance.  
5.2.3. One proposed means for reform, the statutory approach, is not feasible. 
The study, in chapter four, found that the statutory dispute resolution mechanism, does not enjoy 
enough political support to be implemented as a formal means of sovereign debt restructuring. By 
itself, it may also be insufficient to prevent holdout behaviour, a key concern when dealing with 
sovereign debt restructuring. 
5.2.4. The suggested alternative to the statutory approach, the private contractual method 
is insufficient.  
The thesis evaluated the use of contractual clauses, such as the Collective Action Clauses, for the 
facilitation of sovereign debt restructuring, and found that as a standalone mechanism, it is 
insufficient. Importantly, it does not deal with the bilateral creditors that a good number of nations, 
and in particular, African nations are indebted to. Indeed, even for debt restructuring for debt owed 
to bondholders, it does not suffice as a mechanism. 
5.2.5. A multifaceted, hybrid approach is necessary to restructure sovereign debt. 
In chapter four, the study found that owing to the inefficiencies of the current debt restructuring 
mechanisms, as well as the inadequacies of the proposed reforms to the sovereign debt 
restructuring regime, there is need for reform. An ad hoc, unpredictable, costly, and fragmented 
system of sovereign debt restructuring is detrimental to debtor countries. It is particularly harmful 





Additionally, because of the sheer cost, a costly mechanism pushes countries further into debt 
distress. The proposed reform that the chapter found most comprehensive and suitable for the 
restructuring of African debt, is one that is statute based, and enjoys the complementarities of 
contractual clauses, to create a framework that is comprehensive, inclusive, efficient and 
predictable. The research also concluded that the United Nations would be best placed to create 
and operationalize such a framework, with the help of stakeholder nations.  
5.3. Recommendations  
Based on these findings, the study recommends the following:  
5.3.1. Need for concerted efforts towards creating a multifaceted framework for sovereign 
debt restructuring spearheaded by the United Nations, the African Union, as well as 
International Financial Institutions 
As it has been established, there is need for a multifaceted mechanism for sovereign debt 
restructuring. Therefore, there needs to be efforts towards setting up the same. There ought to be 
established, a statutory mechanism that uses the complementarities afforded by contractual clauses 
in debt instruments to bolster its effectiveness.  
Notably, after the SDRM proposal was spurned by a number of countries, key stakeholders 
including international financial institutions and multilateral agencies shelved the proposal with a 
view to improve the use of the contractual approach. However, as it has been illustrated, this 
approach is not sufficient. The Clubs’ methods, are not, either. Political opinions and positions on 
this cannot be considered immutable and as such, effort should be made towards establishing such 
a framework, and courting support for the same. This study also proposes the involvement of the 
African Union, noting the unique needs of its member countries. 
5.3.2. Promotion of debt sustainability in African countries, and among lenders 
Whilst the creation of a proper debt restructuring mechanism is important, this study would be 
remiss if it did not mention that even more pertinent, is a coalesced effort towards increasing debt 
sustainability for African countries. Debt distress impacts the citizens of African nations. It distorts 
economic and social policies, to the detriment of these citizens. Further than that, unsustainable 
debt has grave implications on the global financial system. Additionally, when countries hold 





more particular to African countries, owing to the vulnerability of their economies. The importance 
of establishing important debt sustainability mechanisms, and detecting and forestalling debt 
distress, cannot be overemphasized. The AfDB recommends a return to concessional finance, so 
as to reduce the cost of debt. This study, in taking cognizance of the fact that debt distress is not a 
single party problem, also recommends responsible lending and responsible borrowing. It goes 
further to recommend that the doctrine of odious debt be developed further, while taking into 
account the sovereignty of nations, so as to deter reckless lending and borrowing, and to ease the 
burden of servicing errant debt, that has been channeled to corrupt enterprise, on the citizenry of 
African nations.  
5.4. Further Research 
This study recommends as possible focus for further research, inter alia, the creation of a No-
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